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Agents
One good, the price of which is normalized at unity.
the representative peasant family, which
produces the good from land and labor,
derives utility from its consumption, the number of its
children and from its social status determined by its wealth
relative to the other peasant families, and
invests in agricultural technology to improve the productivity
of the land it cultivates.
the representative landowner, which consumes all of its
rents it collects from the peasant family.
Ulla Lehmijoki University of Helsinki HECER and IZA, Tapio Palokangas University of Helsinki HECER, IZA and IIASALand Reforms and Population Growth
The economy
The dynamics of the peasant family
Sharecropping
The landowner rents a farm out to the peasant family
taking a share of the crop as a return.
The interaction of these agents is an extended game:
1 The landowner attempts to monitor the peasant family with
costs.
2 The peasant family hides some of its crop from the
landowner with costs.
This game is solved in reverse order.
In the equilibrium of this extended game, the peasant
family earns a fixed proportion α of its crop Y :
α =
{
1 as an independent farmer,
γ ∈ (0,1) as a tenant farmer.
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Population dynamics
The peasant family has L(t) members at time t . Its (net)
fertility rate n is
n .=
L˙
L
.
=
1
L
dL
dt
,
where (˙) is the time derivative.
The family improves the productivity of land, A, by its
investment I:
A˙ .=
dA
dt
= I.
We normalize the area of land at unity, so that the input of
efficient land equals A.
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Production technology
The number of family members employed in child rearing,
qnL, is in fixed proportion q to total fertility nL at any time.
The rest of the family,
N .= L− qnL = (1− qn)L,
works in the family farm.
The composite product Y is made from labor input N and
efficient land A according to the linearly homogeneous
production function
Y = F (N,A), FN
.
=
∂F
∂N
> 0, FA
.
=
∂F
∂A
> 0, FNN
.
=
∂2F
∂N2
< 0,
FAA
.
=
∂F
∂A2
< 0, FNA
.
=
∂2F
∂N∂A
> 0.
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Land reform
A land reform increases the family’s crop share α from γ to
1.
In return, the landowner’s lost wealth is compensated by a
debt which the family repays over time.
We assume that if a family is split into smaller families,
then its debt is divided in proportion to family members.
This allows us to define the debt in per capita terms.
We furthermore assume that a fixed proportion β of per
capita debt b will be repaid at each time, for simplicity:
b˙ = −βb.
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Initial debt
Per capita output at time t is Y (t)/L(t) = F
(
1−qn(t),a(t)).
The landowner’s rate of time preference is a constant σ.
On the assumption that the economy is in the steady state
at time t = 0, the present value of the landowner’s per
capita output is F (1− qn0,a0)/σ, where
a0
.
= lim
t→0−
a(t), n0
.
= lim
t→0−
n(t),
are the predetermined values of a and n at time t = 0.
Of the present value of output, F (1− qn0,a0)/σ, the
landowner forfeits the proportion α− γ, if a land reform
increases the peasant family’s crop share α at time t = 0.
Because the family compensates this loss to the landowner
as a debt, the initial value for per capita debt b(t) is
b(0) = (α− γ)F (1− qn0,a0)/σ.
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Investment in productivity
The family spends its income αY on consumption C,
investment I and repayments βbL of debt bL. Denoting
consumption per capita by c .= C/L and the productivity of
land per capita by a .= A/L, the family’s budget constraint
becomes
A˙ = I = αY − C − βbL = [αF (1− qn,a)− c − βb]L.
We obtain the per capita budget constraint
a˙ =
A˙
L
− L˙
L
A
L
=
A˙
L
− na = αF (1− qn,a)− c − βb − na.
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Temporary utility
The family derives temporary utility from the per capita
consumption and the proportion of young in the family, n (=
the fertility rate), which characterizes the status provided
by children in a rural society.
A single family has the higher status, the higher input of
efficient land per capita it has (i.e. the higher a .= A/L)
relative to that among all families on the average, a. Thus,
we augment the temporary utility by an increasing and
concave function v(a− a) of the difference a− a.
The temporary utility is therefore given by
u(t) = log c + θ log n(t) + εv
(
a(t)− a(t)),
where θ > 0 and ε > 0 are the constant weights for
children and status.
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The optimal plan
The peasant family’s rate of time preference is a constant
ρ > 0.
The peasant family maximize its expected discounted
utility at time t = 0,
U =
∫ ∞
0
u(t)e−ρtdt =
∫ ∞
0
[
log c + θ log n + εv(a− a)]e−ρtdt ,
by its fertility n and per capita consumption c subject to its
budget constraint and the repayment of debt;
a˙ = αF (1− qn,a)− c − βb − na, b˙ = −βb.
Solving this problem by maximum principle, we obtain a
system of four equations with two state and two co-state
variables. Because there are two stable and two unstable
roots, there is a saddle point solution.
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The long-run effect of a land reform 1
We examine now the effect of a land reform on the
steady-state equilibrium of the system.
First, we consider the effect of α on the assumption that
α ∈ [γ,1] is a continuous variable. The reform increases
both the crop share α and the initial debt for the family at
time t = 0.
If the desire to accumulate wealth relative to desire to have
children, εθ , is high and the repayment rate of the debt, β, is
slow, we obtains the result:
Proposition
In the long run, a marginal increase of the peasant family’s crop
share α increases per capita efficient land a∗, but decreases
the fertility rate n∗.
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The long-run effect of a land reform 2
Because this result holds for all values α ∈ [γ,1], it can be
generalized for the discrete choice α ∈ {γ,1} as well:
Proposition
In the long run a land reform, where a tenant farmer with
α = γ < 1 becomes an independent farmer with α = 1,
increases per capita efficient land a∗, but decreases the fertility
rate n∗.
Interpretation: An increase of the crop share α raises the rate
of return for investment in land. This promotes the family’s
incentives to transfer resources from child rearing to investment
in land.
Ulla Lehmijoki University of Helsinki HECER and IZA, Tapio Palokangas University of Helsinki HECER, IZA and IIASALand Reforms and Population Growth
